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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1988). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The ruling was 
announced from the bench on June 20, 1988, and memorialized in an 
order which was signed and entered on July 14, 1988. R. 72-74. 
On August 16, 1988, thirty-three days after the entry of the 
order, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and a "Notice of 
Extension of Time to Appeal." R. 75-78. The "Notice of 
Extension of Time to Appeal" was treated as a Rule 4(e) Motion to 
Extend the Time to Appeal. R. 97-98. 
On September 12, 1988, the district court denied the 
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal and on the next day 
plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the district court's 
denial of its motion to extend the time to appeal. R. 89-92. 
The Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to 
Appeal was signed and entered on September 19, 1988. R. 97-98. 
The denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal 
is the subject of this appeal.-
The appeal from the July 14, 1988 Order dismissing 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was dismissed by this Court as 
untimely. (Case No. 880386). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There is only one issue on appeal: Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for 
extension of time to appeal? 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Rule 4(a) of the RuLes of the Utah Supreme Court 
provides: 
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case 
in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the district court to the Supreme Court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the district court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from; provided however, when a judgment or order is 
entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful 
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court 
within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from. 
Rule 4(c) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
provide: 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. 
Except as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the 
judgment or order of the district court shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
Rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
provides: 
Extension of time to appeal. The district court, 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the 
expiration of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of 
this rule. Any such motion which is filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte 
unless the district court otherwise requires. Notice 
of any such motion which is filed after expiration of 
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the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the district court rules of 
practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the 
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of 
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings And The 
Disposition Below. 
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on June 24, 
1987 and an amended complaint on July 9, 1987. R. 2-19. 
Defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. 
R. 26-38. In response to defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, 
plaintiffs filed a memorandum and affidavit in support. R. 
46-50. The motion was heard on June 20, 1988 by Judge Dennis 
Frederick. R. 72. The district court considered the motion as a 
motion for summary judgment and based on the record and the 
absence of any material issues of fact, dismissed the complaint. 
R. 72. The ruling was announced in court and a proposed order 
was mailed to plaintiffs1 counsel on June 22, 1988. R. 72-74. 
The order of dismissal was entered on July 14, 1988. 
R. 73-74. The order became final and appealable on August 15, 
1988. On August 16, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal 
and a "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal. R. 75-78. On 
September 12, 1988, Judge Frederick considered the "Notice of 
Extension of Time to Appeal" as a Rule 4(e) motion to extend the 
time to appeal. After consideration of the affidavit of Peter 
Waldo and the arguments of counsel, the district court denied 
plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to appeal. R. 89. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts involved in this case are as follows: 
1. On June 24, 1987 plaintiffs filed their complaint 
and on July 9, 1987 plaintiffs filed their first amended 
complaint. R. 2-10 and 11-19. 
2. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs1 Amended 
Complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations. R. 26-33. 
3. In response to defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, 
plaintiffs filed a memorandum that was supported by the Affidavit 
of Walter P. Larson dated October 16, 1987. R. 46-50. 
4. After considering the memoranda, affidavits and 
arguments of counsel, Judge Frederick granted defendants1 Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and announced this 
decision from the bench at the hearing held on June 20, 1988. R. 
72. 
5. A copy of the order, which was signed by Judge 
Frederick on July 14, 1988 without any modifications, was mailed 
to plaintiffs' counsel, on June 22, 1988. R. 73-74. 
6. The Order of Dismissal was signed and entered on 
July 14, 1988. R. 73-74. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of The Rules of the Supreme 
Court, plaintiffs had thirty (30) days to file a Notice of Appeal 
with the clerk of the district court. 
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8. The thirty days expired on August 15, 1988 without 
plaintiffs having filed the requisite notice or motion for 
extension of time. R. 73-78. 
9. On August 16, 1988, after the time period had 
expired, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and "Notice of 
Extension of Time to Appeal." R. 75-78. 
10. Plaintiffs admit in their Notice of Appeal and 
"Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal" that they were 
2/ 
represented by counsel during the appeal period.- R. 75-78. 
11. On September 12, 1988, Judge Frederick denied 
plaintiffs1 Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal (mistitled 
"Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal") and announced this 
ruling from the bench. R. 89. 
12. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, John J. 
Borsos, at the September 12, 1988 hearing. R. 89. 
13. On September 14, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Notice 
of Appeal to this Court, which appeal is the basis of this 
proceeding. R. 90-92. This Notice of Appeal included an 
Affidavit of Walter P. Larson, dated September 13, 1988. R. 
90-95. 
Defendants believe that paragraphs 13 through 15 of 
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts are misleading. Those 
statements refer to the pro se filing of a Notice of Appeal, 
yet the record discloses no absence of counsel during the 
appeal period. Furthermore, the August 16, 1988 Notice of 
Appeal was signed by John J. Borsos on behalf of Walter P. 
Larson, pro se and John J. Borsos formally appeared as 
plaintiffs' counsel on September 8, 1988. R. 77-78 and 80. 
Peter Waldo has never withdrawn as plaintiffs' counsel. 
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14. The September 13, 1988 Affidavit of Walter P. 
Larson was not presented to the district court and was not 
3/ 
considered by the district court*- R. 89-95, 
15. On September 19, 1988, the district court signed 
the Order Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for Extension of Time* R. 
97-99. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only issue properly presented for appeal is whether 
the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs1 
motion for an extension of time to appeal after the notice of 
appeal was filed late. Not only did the district court act well 
within the boundaries of its discretion, but its ruling in 
denying plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time was clearly 
correct. 
Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of 
excusable neglect. The only reason given for the late filing — 
that plaintiffs' attorney did not know the last day in which 
notice of appeal could be filed -- indicates inadvertence and 
oversight on the part of plaintiffs' counsel. Therefore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. 
2/ Defendants object to the consideration of paragraph 19 of 
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts since those facts were not 
considered by the district court in ruling on plaintiffs' 
Motion for Extension of Time. R. 89 and 90-95. See Point 
IIA, infra. 
-6-
Defendants petition the Court to strike Section II of 
plaintiffs1 brief. That section addresses the district court's 
ruling on defendants1 motion to dismiss. An appeal on that 
decision has already been dismissed by this Court. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs did not raise any issue addressed in Section II as an 
issue in their docketing statement. These arguments are not 
properly before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME. 
Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
provides that a "notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the 
clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." The filing of a 
notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite essential to securing appellate 
review. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah 1984). S^ ee Browder v. Director, DepTt of 
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1978); Mayfield v. United 
States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.5 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam). 
The court may grant an extension of time in which to 
file a notice of appeal "upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause . . . ." Utah RSC 4(e). However, this Court has 
declared that standard "necessarily a strict one." Prowswood, 
Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 959. See 
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Varian-Eimac Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570-71 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (Utah appellate courts have consistently held that 
jurisdiction is terminated once a statutory time limit is 
exceeded). Furthermore, a district court's factual determination 
in applying that standard will not be overturned absent an abuse 
of the court's discretion. Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d 
611, 615 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 997 (1968); 
Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 961. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Rule 4 states: 
Excusable neglect or good cause under [Rule 4] refers 
generally to an extraordinary circumstance that 
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of 
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the part 
of counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize 
an appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has reaffirmed that 
"[iInadvertence or mistake of counsel does not constitute the 
type of unique or extraordinary circumstances contemplated by 
[the] strict standard" of Rule 4. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d at 960. 
In this case, plaintiffs have failed to show any 
extraordinary circumstances. The only reason offered for the 
late filing is that the attorney "did not know when the last day 
to file an appeal was." Appellants' Brief at 9 (emphasis added). 
There is no dispute that plaintiffs' attorney was present in 
court on June 20, 1988 when the district court made its ruling 
and that both plaintiffs and their attorney were aware of that 
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ruling. Rule 4(c) of Rules of the Utah Supreme Court allows for 
a notice of appeal to be filed prior to the entry of an order. 
The appeal therefore could have been filed immediately after the 
4/ . . district courtfs decision was announced in court.- The decision 
to wait until the last possible day — and to then fail to 
calculate what that day was — amounts to nothing other than 
inadvertence and oversight. 
In their brief, plaintiffs also claim that their 
attorney stated that "fthe court had not yet signed the order so 
there was no need to file a notice of appeal.1" Appellants1 
Brief at 9 (citing R. 94). This statement indicates that counsel 
was aware of the opportunity to file but rather chose to wait 
until after the entry of the order. This further indicates 
inadvertence, not extraordinary circumstances. 
The affidavit of Peter Waldo, filed in support of 
plaintiff's Motion for Extentions of Time, states in paragraph 4 
that "[d]ue to lack of communications with the Larsons, an appeal 
was not filed by our office." R. at 87-88. This statement also 
demonstrates oversight and inadvertence on the part of 
plaintiffs' attorney. Lack of communication between counsel and 
client does not give rise to a showing of extraordinary 
circumstance. See Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
This appeal is taken from an order entered September 19, 
1988. The notice of appeal was filed prior to the entry of 
the order on September 13, 1988, and only one day after the 
hearing. Plaintiffs are obviously aware of the provisions 
of Rule 4(c). 
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676 P.2d at 960-61. The Waldo affidavit actually supports the 
district courtfs ruling. 
The affidavit of Walter Larson upon which plaintiffs 
now rely so extensively, see Appellants' Brief at 8, 1f 19, was 
not before the district court at the time of the hearing on 
September 12, 1988. The Larson affidavit is dated September 13, 
1988, one day after the district court decided this matter. The 
affidavit was filed as an attachment to the notice of appeal. 
Since this affidavit was not considered by the district court it 
is not properly part of the record on appeal and cannot be 
considered by this Court in determining whether the lower court 
abused its discretion. 
The affidavit, even if considered, does not demonstrate 
excusable neglect. Plaintiffs lament that they had moved from 
the state, that the California family home was threatened with 
foreclosure, and that one of the family members was suffering 
blindness and a nervous breakdown while another had sustained a 
traumatic neck injury. Appellant's Brief at 10. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs complain that there is now a conflict between 
themselves and the attorney who represented them throughout the 
time period for appeal. However, these facts are irrelevant to 
the issue of excusable neglect. As the Tenth Circuit stated in 
Buckley, "[t]he multiplication of inadequate reasons for holding 
[counsel's] neglect excusable serves only to emphasize their 
inadequacy." Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d at 615. 
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A. Rule 58A(d) Does Not Affect The Time For Filing A 
Notice Of Appeal, 
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. However, that rule deals with the entry of a 
judgment. In this case, the defendants had no obligation under 
Rule 58A(d) since no judgment was entered. The court simply 
granted their motion to dismiss. 
Furthermore, the rule itself states expressly that "the 
time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision." Utah RCP 58A(d). It is clear 
that Rule 58A(d) does not extend the filing period, nor does 
non-compliance give rise to excusable neglect. 
The case of McGarr v. United States, 736 F.2d 912 (3rd 
Cir. 1984), relied on by plaintiffs is distinguishable. In 
McGarr, the attorney had written two letters to the court seeking 
an extension of time to appeal prior to the expiration of the 
period. The court considered the letters as ex parte 
applications for extensions of time. Id. at 918. In this case, 
plaintiffs' attorney did nothing prior to the expiration of the 
period to perfect the appeal. Plaintiffs1 reliance on Graco 
Fishing & Rental Tools Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 735 
P.2d 62 (Utah 1987) is similarly misplaced. In that case this 
Court did not address the extension of time issue but instead 
remanded "to allow the respondents the opportunity to oppose the 
appellants1 motion for an extension of time . . ., and for the 
district court to then rule on the motion". Id. at 63. Also 
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Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Utah Depft of Transp., 589 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979) is distinguishable. In that case 
appellant's notice of appeal from an administrative decision was 
found timely. Id. at 783. 
In Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d at 613, the 
defendant's attorney attempted to argue that failure to receive 
notice gave rise to excusable neglect. The Tenth Circuit 
unequivocally stated that counsel's "claim that his neglect was 
caused by waiting for a notice from the clerk is not a basis for 
a plea of excusable neglect." Id. at 614. There -- as here — 
"not only . . . was [there] no clear abuse of the trial judge's 
discretion, but . . . his ruling was clearly correct." _Id. at 
615. 
B. Plaintiffs Were Represented By Counsel At All Relevant 
Times. 
Page 15 of the plaintiffs' brief suggests that their 
late filing should be considered under a more lenient standard 
because, subsequent to the inaction of their attorney, they filed 
a notice of appeal pro se. However, plaintiffs admit that during 
the period of time during which an appeal could have been filed 
they were represented by counsel. In fact, the notice of appeal 
that was filed was actually signed by the attorney on behalf of 
the plaintiffs. Furthermore, whether the appeal was pro se or 
not, plaintiffs' failure to make a motion before the end of the 
filing period extinguished any right to appeal. Mayfield v. 
United States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d at 1055. See Shah v. 
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Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984) ("proceeding pro se does not change 
the clear language" of Rule 4(a)); superseding Shah v. Hutto, 704 
F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1983); United States ex. rel. v. Leonard 
O'Leary, 788 F.2d 1238, 1240 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 
(circuits agree that proceeding pro se does not warrant exception 
to Rule 4(a)). 
II. NO ISSUE RELATING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE IS 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
A. Section II Of Plaintiffs' Brief Should Be Stricken. 
The district court granted defendants1 motion to 
dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs1 causes of action were 
barred by the statute of limitations. In Section II of their 
brief, Appellants' Brief at 17-21, plaintiffs undertake to argue 
that ff[i]ssues of fact and a correct view of the law of 
limitation of actions . . . require reversal of the order of 
dismissal." Plaintiffs then argue that the district court's 
decision should be reviewed as though the order of dismissal was 
5/ 
on appeal before this Court.-
An appeal of the order of dismissal has already been 
dismissed by this Court. Case No. 880386. As part of that 
ruling, this Court also denied plaintiffs1 motion to consolidate 
Plaintiffs also contend that a statute of limitations 
defense cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss. This 
position is contrary to well-established legal authority. 
See 2A Moorefs Federal Practice 11 12.10. See In re Estate 
of Sullivan, 506 P.2d 813, 817 (Wyo. 1973); Kellar v. 
Snowden, 87 Nev. 488, 489 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1971). 
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the appeals. By including this argument in their brief, 
plaintiffs are attempting to obtain indirectly what they could 
not obtain directly. Furthermore, the issue has been waived 
since plaintiffs failed to include any reference to the issue in 
their docketing statement. Any argument relating to a statute of 
limitations issue is waived. See Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 
220 Kan. 300, 553 P.2d 885, 899 (Kan. 1976) (point asserted for 
first time in appeal brief must be stricken). Defendants submit 
that Section II of plaintiffs1 brief should be stricken since the 
issue addressed therein is not properly before the Court. 
B. The District Court Properly Granted Defendants' Motion 
To Dismiss. 
Since plaintiffs have argued the district court's grant 
of dismissal, defendants provide the following summary of 
arguments for this Court. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint containing four causes 
of action on June 24, 1987. All four causes of action related to 
the terms of an alleged verbal agreement whereby defendants 
supposedly agreed to submit a debtor's plan in the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, In re Larson Ford Sales, Bankruptcy No. 82C-02186, 
pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah. All four causes of action were governed by a four year 
statute of limitations. U.C.A. S 78-12-25(1) and (3) (1953, as 
amended). 
Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief was for breach of 
the alleged verbal agreement in that defendants had filed a 
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creditor1s plan rather than a debtor1s plan of reorganization. 
The creditor's plan which the defendant did submit was confirmed 
on June 10, 1983 and notice of entry was sent on that same day to 
all parties by the Bankruptcy Court. As a generally accepted 
rule, a cause of action upon a verbal contract arises at the time 
of the contract's breach. Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble 
Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984). Since the 
creditor's plan was actually confirmed on June 10, 1983, any 
breach of the alleged verbal agreement occurred on or before that 
date. Plaintiffs' claim is time barred since June 10, 1983 is 
more than four years prior to the commencement of this action. 
Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, interference with 
business relations, sounded in intentional tort. The statute of 
limitations in intentional torts begins to run when the tort or 
the activity leading to the tort occurs. Obray v. Malmberq, 26 
Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 1971). The complaint stated 
that the acts underlying this cause of action were done "in order 
that the Defendant Stephen Wade could submit a creditors plan in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy." First Amended Complaint, 11 13. By 
plaintiffs' own admission, all of the alleged tortious conduct 
occurred prior to the defendants' submission of the creditor's 
plan. Thus, the alleged facts that form the basis for this cause 
of action also occurred prior to June 10, 1983. Hence this cause 
of action is also time barred. 
Plaintiffs' Third and Fourth Causes of Action included 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, 
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conversion and punitive damages. These claims were based on 
conduct which was alleged to have occurred during and in 
connection with the verbal contract negotiations. Since the 
verbal contract was alleged to have been entered into in January 
1983, these causes of action are also time barred. 
Plaintiffs also complain that the court granted the 
motion to dismiss without requiring that the creditors1 plan of 
reorganization be placed into evidence. A copy of the notice of 
confirmation was attached to defendants1 memorandum in support of 
their motion to dismiss. The notice was mailed to all parties 
involved in this bankruptcy proceeding on June 10, 1983. 
Plaintiffs cannot claim that they did know of any breach prior to 
June 24, 1983, because the notice states expressly that a 
creditors' plan had been confirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants ask the court to 
affirm the district court's denial of plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Extension of Time. Furthermore, defendants ask the court to 
strike Section II of plaintiffs' brief. 
DATED this ,-rLJ> day of August 1989. 
[J^^/Lt 
Gary E. Jubber 
Patrick L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
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